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Interdistrict Mobility and Charter Schools in Arizona: Understanding the 




Many policymakers view market-oriented school choice policies such as charter 
schools and open enrollment as ways to stimulate competition among schools and 
provide families with improved schooling options.  In this paper, we examine the 
patterns of interdistrict student movement within the public school sector in Arizona, or 
student movement between traditional public school districts (hereafter referred to as 
“school districts”) and between school districts and charter schools.  Arizona has 
supported public school choice through interdistrict enrollment policies and charter 
school reform since the early 1990s.  Our analysis addresses lesser-known and 
understood outcomes of public school choice policies that have particular relevance for 
other state and local settings where multiple public school choice programs are operating 
simultaneously.   
This analysis extends an exploratory study that focused on student movement 
patterns within metropolitan Phoenix, the largest public school “market” in Arizona to 
assess if the patterns we documented are evident statewide and within other areas of the 
state (Authors, 2012).  Our research questions are:   
a) What are the patterns of student mobility between and within public school 
sectors in Arizona?  
b) What are the relationships between district and charter school mobility rates 
and other district or school characteristics? 
c) Are there variations in the patterns of student movement within and across 
local markets?   
We expected to find differences in the patterns of movement between districts and 
charter schools and that these differences are associated with district or school 
characteristics.  We also expected to find differences within and across educational 
settings that reflect regional differences in the configuration of districts and charter 
schools.  Our findings indicate that most students in Arizona move between districts 
rather than from districts to charter schools.  We also document a two-way pattern of 
movement between charters and school districts. 
A substantial body of research explores the causes and consequences of student 
movement between public school districts and charter schools (e.g., Garcia, 2008; 
Renzulli & Evans, 2005; Weiher & Tedlin, 2002).  Likewise, numerous studies have 
assessed the characteristics of students who participate in interdistrict choice programs 
(e.g., Fossey, 1994; Holme & Richards, 2009; Witte & Thorn, 1996) and the influences 
on school districts’ participation in, and responses to, interdistrict choice (e.g., Fowler, 
1996; Ghosh, 2010).  The present study is unique because we document patterns of 
student movement within the public school sector in local education markets by 
analyzing interdistrict and charter school movement simultaneously in a state with long-
standing school choice policies.  These patterns of student movement are potentially 
relevant for policymakers in other state and local contexts because can they help us 
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assess the extent to which public school choice policies have fostered the education 
markets that policymakers envisioned.  Given the continual growth in the charter school 
sector (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016), our findings may also provide insights about 
patterns of student movement in other settings where multiple public school choice 
policies are operating simultaneously.  These findings also have implications for the 
school leaders in these settings who have to grapple with the possible fiscal 
consequences of declining enrollments and the challenges of educating students who 
move frequently between districts and sectors (Moody’s Investor Service, 2013).  If the 
Trump administration’s efforts to provide school vouchers for tuition at private schools 
are successful (Klein & Ujifusa, 2017), our findings may also help predict the possible 
effects of introducing voucher programs alongside existing public school choice 
programs on student enrollments. 
 
School Choice in Arizona 
 
Charter schools operate in 42 states and the District of Columbia (DC), and 
enrolled 2.5 million students in 2013-14 (U.S. Department of Education, 2016).  They 
serve a small but growing share of public school students.  Between 1999-2000 and 
2013-2014, charter school enrollment increased from 0.7 percent of public school 
students to 5.1 percent (U.S. Department of Education, 2014, 2016).  Forty-six states and 
DC have some type of open enrollment policies outlined in their state education codes 
(Wixom, 2017).  Mandatory interdistrict open enrollment policies require districts to 
take part in them, whereas voluntary policies allow districts to choose if they will 
participate (Wixom, 2017). While many states with mandatory open enrollment policies 
target specific geographic locations, schools, or groups of students (e.g., students 
attending low performing schools or low income students), Arizona is one of 11 states 
that does not limit families’ participation in interdistrict open enrollment.1 As a result, all 
Arizona school districts must allow students to enroll in their schools, space permitting, 
regardless of their districts of residence. 
Although most public school students do not utilize school choice programs or 
policies (Garcia, 2010; Grady & Bielick, 2010; Snyder et al., 2016), expanding school 
choice has been a long-standing goal of Arizona policymakers.  Arizona’s provisions for 
open enrollment and charter schools were approved by the state legislature in 1994 in a 
single bill, HB 2002 during a special legislative session (Author, 2009).2  The open 
enrollment and charter school provisions in HB 2002 put Arizona at the forefront of the 
movement to expand public school choice.  Arizona was the seventh state to pass 
legislation mandating open enrollment policies for all public school districts (State of 
                                                 
1 The other 10 states are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Utah.  Alaska and Arkansas require interdistrict open enrollment for students attending schools 
in facilities distress, while Vermont limits interdistrict open enrollment to high school students (Wixom, 
2017). 
2 HB 2002 was a compromise from earlier bills considered by the Arizona legislature during the two 
regular legislative sessions that preceded it (Luther, 1995).  The final version of HB 2002 did not include a 
school voucher program in earlier versions of the bill. 
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Missouri, 2009).3 Before HB 2002 took effect, Arizona school districts established their 
own policies regarding the enrollment of non-resident students, and a considerable 
number of students took advantage of these policies.   
According to an early analysis conducted by the Arizona Department of 
Education (Gallagher, 1992), more than 40,000 students opted to enroll in schools 
outside their assigned school districts in 1992 (Gallagher, 1992).  Between the 2004-05 
and 2007-08 academic years, more than one-quarter of K-12 students in Arizona 
transferred schools, with just under 15% of students making an interdistrict transfer and 
approximately 6% of students transferring to a school within their districts of residence 
(Fong, Bae, & Huang, 2010).  Likewise, Arizona was the fourth state to pass charter 
school legislation.  In 2013-14, charter schools comprised 27% of all Arizona K-12 
schools and enrolled 18% of the school-age population (U.S. Department of Education, 
2015).  While these figures suggest that Arizona’s public school choice policies have 
created a unique education market, similarly high mobility rates have been documented 




Market-oriented school choice policies such as interdistrict choice and charter 
schools are a means of ensuring that students are not required to attend an assigned 
public school based on where they live.  The key assumption underlying market-oriented 
choice is that given the opportunity, many families will strategically seek out and move 
to better schools for their children, a process we refer to as active choice (Authors, 2012).  
Ideally, schools will compete for such students by finding market niches through some 
form of differentiation (Chubb & Moe, 1990).  School choice advocates contend that 
competition will force districts and schools to function as education markets and thereby 
make them more efficient, effective, and responsive to the needs of parents and students 
(Friedman, 1962).  As a result, schools will improve over time as they vie for students or 
close if they lose market share (e.g., Forster, 2013; Hoxby, 2003).  
In essence, market-oriented school choice policies are aimed at facilitating a 
form of Tiebout choice, where consumers (parents and students) choose residential 
locations that provide the services that best meet their needs and preferences (Tiebout, 
1956; Urquiola, 2005).  These can include districts or schools that offer specific 
curricular foci (e.g., the performing arts, science and mathematics), child-rearing 
philosophies, instructional approaches, or extracurricular activities.  Some researchers 
have argued that active choice facilitated by school choice policies can ultimately 
benefit students (Hanushek et al., 2004).  They claim that when families choose among 
schools to find better matches, in the aggregate and over time these school moves will 
raise school quality as measured by student achievement.  Yet other studies suggest that 
most school changes depress student achievement (Grigg, 2012; Ni & Rorrer, 2012).  In 
addition, critics of market-oriented school reforms argue that charter schools and other 
                                                 
3  Minnesota, Iowa, Arkansas, Nebraska, Washington, and Utah passed open enrollment laws before 
Arizona (State of Missouri, 2009). 
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forms of school choice such as voucher programs may increase racial and 
socioeconomic segregation (e.g., Cobb & Glass, 1999; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & 
Wang, 2011; Frankenberg, Kotok, Schafft, & Mann, 2017; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, 
Moser, & Henig, 2002; Lubienski, Gulosino, & Weitzel, 2009; Renzulli & Evans, 2005).   
Perhaps most importantly, even in states or districts with long-standing school 
choice policies, most students attend their assigned public schools (Dauter & Fuller, 
2015; Grady & Bielick, 2010), or remain enrolled in the same schools from one year to 
the next (Garcia, 2010).  Moreover, most forms of student movement cannot be reliably 
attributed to active choice.  That is, even in states with mandatory interdistrict choice 
policies, it is likely that some student mobility between school districts is a result of 
active choice while other forms of mobility are reactive (Rumberger, 2003).  Changes in 
families’ residence or employment often prompt school moves.  Some researchers 
distinguish between active choice and reactive mobility and argue that the latter is more 
disruptive to students’ learning and lowers school achievement (Hanushek et al., 2004; 




We analyzed the nonpromotional 4  movement of elementary grade students 
enrolled in a district or charter school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who 
transferred to another district or charter school within the local education market at the 
beginning of 2008-09 for reasons other than “aging out” of elementary grades.  Our 
measures of student movement are district and charter school-level exit and entry rates.  
We used the Office of Management and Budget’s Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) 
as our proxy for local education markets because they delineate geographic areas that are 
socially and economically integrated (United States Census Bureau, 2012).5  While we 
cannot directly assess families’ motivations for changing schools, we focus on a specific 
type of student movement, school changes between school years, because unlike 
mobility during the school year, these are more likely to be a result of active choice than 
mid-year school changes.  Our assumption is that student movement between sectors 
(districts to charter schools and vice versa) is more likely to be a form of active choice, 
as is some of the movement between districts within CBSAs.  Because some of the 
patterns we observe are likely shaped in part by reactive mobility (i.e., some of the 
student movement between districts), below we provide an overview of research on 





                                                 
4 Non-promotional movement is student mobility between districts or charter schools that is not due to 
regular grade level progression. 
5 CBSAs are statistical areas that contain minimum populations of 10,000 and include core urban areas 
and adjacent counties. 
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Nationally, charter schools tend to serve fewer White students and a higher 
percentage of African American students than traditional public schools (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2016), although there is considerable variation in charter 
school demographics within and across states and regions (Frankenberg et al., 2011).  
These demographic differences are attributable in part to locale; charter schools tend to 
be concentrated in urban areas, particularly in large cities that have greater percentages 
of minority students.  Some studies indicate that charter schools increase racial and 
ethnic segregation in public schools by increasing the number of racially-isolated 
schools (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Frankenberg et al., 2011; Gulosino 
& d’Entremont, 2011; Whitehurst, 2017).  However, Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, and McGee 
(2010) critique the claim that school segregation is attributable to charter schools 
because the traditional public schools students would otherwise attend are also 
segregated (see Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, and Orfield’s [2010] response).   
Whitehurst (2017) assessed the relationship between a district-level index of 
public school choice with a measure of the racial imbalance between high school 
enrollments and the school-age population of the schools’ catchment area for 106 of the 
largest districts in the U.S.  He found a positive correlation between school choice 
options and racial imbalance for blacks and whites; districts with a broader array of 
policies that enable school choice tend to be more racially imbalanced than districts with 
more limited choice policies.  Choice policies were not associated with racial imbalances 
of Hispanic and Asian students.  Studies using student-level data to conduct finer-
grained analyses of student movement patterns confirm these broader trends.  Most 
students who move from traditional public schools to charter schools move to charter 
schools with higher percentages of racially similar students although there is 
considerable variation across groups and locales (Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Frankenberg et 
al., 2017; Garcia, 2008; Whitehurst, 2017).  
Finch, Lapsley, and Baker-Boudissa (2009) examined the influences that shape 
non-promotional movement out of charter schools in Indiana.  While they did not 
compare charter schools with traditional public schools, they documented high exit rates 
from of a sample of 11 charter schools that were more than a year old in 2003-04.  Non-
White students and lower achieving students were more likely to leave charter schools 
before they reached the highest grade offered by the schools than their White and higher 
achieving peers.  In contrast, Ni and Rorrer (2012) documented lower turnover in charter 
schools compared to traditional public schools in Utah.  However, Utah’s charter 
schools tend to serve a predominantly White and more affluent student population than 
charter schools in other states, so the lower mobility rate they observed may be related in 
part to student demographics. 
 Overall, these studies did not address the effects of these demographic patterns 
and enrollment trends on school districts, although they do provide important insights 
into broader state or regional enrollment trends, the factors associated with students’ 
movement to charter schools, and achievement outcomes.  They also tend to focus on a 
single form of public school choice.  In our earlier study of student movement between 
school districts in metropolitan Phoenix (Authors, 2012) we found that urban districts in 
the metropolitan core tended to have higher rates of mobility and a greater number of 
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students moving between districts while suburban districts had lower rates of mobility 
but comparatively higher rates of students moving to and from charter schools.  In 
general, mobility patterns tended to be reciprocal rather than one-way, which may be 
more aptly characterized as a two-way pattern rather than one that suggests high levels 




Most analyses of interdistrict choice focus on the relationship between the 
characteristics of school districts and outcomes ranging from participation in a voluntary 
choice program, patterns of student movement, and student demand.  District wealth has 
been identified as a key factor shaping the likelihood that districts will participate in 
voluntary choice programs (Fowler, 1996; Rincke, 2006) and how they respond to the 
loss of students to other districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998, Aud, 1999).  School districts 
may also be more likely to participate in a voluntary interdistrict choice program if 
neighboring districts are participating (Fowler, 1996; Rincke, 2006). 
One consistent finding across states is that receiving districts tend to have greater 
financial resources (e.g., higher per pupil spending, higher family incomes, or property 
values) than sending districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998; Fossey, 1994; Holme & Richard, 
2009; Welsch, Statz, & Skidmore, 2010).  Some studies suggest that families are more 
likely to leave districts with greater percentages of minority and poor students than their 
destination districts (Armor & Peiser, 1998; Welsch et al., 2010).  However, Holme and 
Richard (2009) found evidence of different patterns of mobility among White and 
minority students in metropolitan Denver.  While White students were leaving relatively 
less White and affluent districts for Whiter and lower poverty districts, minority students 
were leaving Whiter and more affluent districts to attend districts with higher 
percentages of poor and minority students.  The net effect of these patterns was to 
increase the racial and class segregation of school districts.   
These patterns may be partially attributable to differences in student achievement.  
Reback (2008) found that district achievement was a stronger predictor of transfer 
requests in Minnesota than measures of socio-economic status and spending.  Moreover, 
districts’ transfer requests tended to increase as test scores in neighboring districts 
decreased.  In a study of the influences on transactional open enrollment flows in 
Colorado and Minnesota, Carlson, Lavery, and Witte (2011) found that higher achieving 
districts and lower poverty districts experienced greater student loss than lower 
achieving districts; transferring students moved to districts with comparatively higher 
achievement and spending than the districts they moved from.  The racial composition 
of districts was not associated with patterns of student movement once other variables 
were accounted for.  The authors suggested that most families participating in 
interdistrict choice were primarily concerned with indicators of school quality such as 
test scores, but other factors (e.g., the demographic composition of school settings) also 
played an important role in families’ choices.  However, transportation or the lack 
thereof may also have shaped these findings.  In settings where families have to provide 
their own transportation to take advantage of school choice programs and policies, poor 
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families are less likely to participate than more affluent families because poor families 




Research on non-promotional student mobility indicates that there is substantial 
student movement between schools (e.g., Fong et al., 2010, U.S. Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2010).  According to Garcia et al. (2010), 15% of Arizona 
elementary school students changed schools between the 2007-08 and 2008-09 academic 
years.  Charter school students were more likely to change schools (23%) than students 
enrolled at traditional public schools (13%) (Garcia et al., 2010). 
In general, student mobility rates vary by geographic locale and student 
demographics (Authors, 2012).  Students in urban areas are more mobile than students in 
suburban or rural areas (U.S. GAO, 1994; Rumberger, 2003).  Lower income, minority, 
special education, and English language learner students tend to have higher rates of 
mobility than their more advantaged peers (Alexander, Entwisle, & Dauber, 1996; Fong 
et al., 2010; Grigg, 2012; Kerbow, 1996; Kerbow, Azcoitia, & Buell, 2003; Lleras & 
McKillips, 2017; Parke & Kanyongo, 2012; Rumberger, 2003; Schafft, 2006; U.S. GAO, 
2010; Wright, 1999).  
Some studies have examined the relationship between mobility and school and 
student achievement.  In an early study, Bruno and Isken (1996) found that in the Los 
Angeles Unified School District the year-to-year mobility rate was negatively related to 
school achievement.  More recently, Parke and Kanyongo (2012) analyzed mobility 
patterns in a large northeastern urban school district and found that there was a 
considerable achievement gap between mobile students and their more stable peers, and 
these gaps were similar across racial/ethnic groups.  Scherrer’s (2012) analysis of data 
from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS-K) indicated that students who 
changed schools between the third and fifth grades had lower reading achievement after 
controlling for race, student socioeconomic status, and school socioeconomic status (see 
also Lleras & McKillip, 2017).  Scherrer (2012) also analyzed the relationship between 
mobility, school socioeconomic status, and school achievement within a single school 
district to suggest that student mobility mediates the relationship between school 
socioeconomic status and school achievement.   
As suggested above, some studies of school choice distinguish between different 
types of mobility and suggest active choice via switching schools to attend a charter 
school has a positive effect on student achievement (Hanushek et al., 2004) although 
other studies have produced conflicting findings.  For example, Bifulco and Ladd (2007) 
found that students who left traditional public schools in North Carolina to attend charter 
schools had lower achievement in both math and reading than their peers who did not 
change schools and that these effects were particularly pronounced for African 
American students whose parents did not attend college.  Likewise, compared to their 
peers who did not change schools, students who transferred from traditional public 
schools to charter schools or another traditional public school in Utah tended to have 
lower achievement, while students who transferred from a charter school to a traditional 
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public school had higher achievement (Ni & Rorrer, 2012).  Grigg (2012) found that 
students in Nashville who changed schools between school years for reasons other than 
promotion had lower math and reading achievement than their stable peers which 
suggests that school moves due to active choice may lower student performance, at least 
in the short term. 
Finally, a limited number of mobility studies address the reasons for student 
movement.  For example, Kerbow et al. (2003) found that students in Chicago moved 
schools due to residential changes (58%) or concerns about safety or academic 
opportunity (42%).  Their findings also suggested that active choice accounted for a 
substantial portion of student movement.  In contrast, Schafft’s (2006) case study of 
student mobility in a poor rural New York school district indicated that 29% of students 
entered or exited the district during the 2003-04 academic year, and these moves tended 
to be an outcome of family poverty and economic instability rather than active choice. 
This study extends the literatures described above by examining patterns of 
movement between school districts and between school districts and charter schools 
simultaneously, which allows us to make comparisons across sectors and regions.  This 
approach has allowed us to highlight an interesting and seldom studied pattern of student 
movement.  Students moved from charter schools and into traditional school districts at 
roughly the same rates as students who left traditional school districts for charter schools.  
In addition, we also document much higher rates of student movement between school 
districts (at least some of which is attributable to active choice) compared to the rates of 
students that leave traditional public schools to attend charter schools.  
 
Data and Methods  
 
We analyzed statewide district-level transactional data (Carlson et al., 2011) 
obtained from the Arizona Department of Education’s Data Warehouse that tracked 
student enrollment for funding purposes.  We also mapped mobility patterns in the three 
largest CBSAs in the state using ArcGIS to compare and contrast the differences within 
and across local markets; our maps allowed us to assess the geospatial relationships 
between the two forms of public school choice.  Our data is comprised of district and 
charter school-level counts of elementary grade students who were eligible for 
enrollment in one of the districts’ schools at two time points (i.e., they did not “age out” 
of the grades offered by the district).  Because in many Arizona communities schools are 
organized into separate elementary and high school districts that essentially function as 
separate markets with different numbers of school districts within the public sector 
(Urquiola, 2005), we focused on districts and charter schools that served elementary 
grade students. There are only 27 high school districts in the state that span multiple 
elementary school districts and cross municipal boundaries.  The large number of small 
elementary districts provides greater options for interdistrict mobility for elementary 
grade students than for high school students.  For example, in central city Phoenix, 11 
elementary districts feed into one high school district.  In addition, many charter high 
schools target at-risk students, a market segment, so they are not competing for the 
general school population in the same way that most elementary-serving charter schools 
8




and districts are.  Finally, focusing on elementary districts also facilitated mapping 
because the two types of districts cover the same geographic areas in some regions.  The 
charter schools were largely clustered in city and suburban districts in the two major 
metropolitan areas in the state, Phoenix and Tucson, although a number of charter 




For each school district and charter school we had counts of: a) the students who 
remained enrolled in the same district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08 
school year and the beginning of 2008-09 (stayers); b) the students who moved to any 
other district or charter school within the state (movers), listed by district or charter 
school; and, c) the racial demographics of stayers and movers.  That is, our analysis 
focuses on elementary grade students who, once enrolled in a district or charter school, 
moved to another school at the beginning of the following school year.  We refer to 
these students as eligible for re-enrollment in the sections that follow.  Our student 
counts did not include students who moved out of the school district or charter school 
because of grade-level progression (e.g., non-promotional moves), students who moved 
out of state, or new students in 2008-09.  We matched this dataset to district-level 
variables in the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data (CCD) 
and aggregated the data to calculate the variables used in our analysis:6   
a) the percentage of students who were enrolled in the school district or charter 
school at the end of the 2007-08 school year who remained enrolled at the 
beginning of the 2008-09 school year (stayers);  
b) the percentage of students who moved to another school district or charter 
school within the state at the beginning of 2008-09 (movers);  
c) the percentage of movers who attended a school district with the same 
CBSA;   
d) the percentage of movers who attended a charter school within the same 
CBSA;  
e) the percentage of students entering the school district or charter school at the 
beginning of 2008-09 from any school district or charter school in the state 
(incomers);  
f) the percentage of incomers who attended another school district within the 
same CBSA in 2007-2008, the previous academic year; and 
g) the percentage of incomers who attended another charter school within the 
same CBSA in 2007-08. 
                                                 
6 Categories c and d are subcategories of category b.  Likewise, categories f and g are subcategories of 
category e.  We used the CCD to identify district type (school district or charter school) and to match 
districts and charter schools to the CBSA.  The denominators for categories a through d were the total of 
stayers plus movers, or all of the students in enrolled in elementary grades in each district at the end of 
2007-08 that were eligible to re-enroll at the beginning of the following academic year (2008-09). The 
denominators for categories e through g were the total of stayers plus incomers.  These counts are 
provided in Table 1 as Students End 2007-08 and Students Beg. 2008-09, respectively. 
9
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We also calculated the percentage difference in reenrollment as the difference between 
the number of the district or charter school’s eligible re-enrollment students at the 
beginning of 2008-09 minus the re-enrollment sample at the end of 2007-08, divided by 
the re-enrollment sample in 2007-08.   
Districts and charter schools without complete information on the sending or 
receiving districts/schools, or those that were missing information on the CBSA from the 
CCD were omitted from the dataset.  This strategy excluded a handful of charter schools 
that closed. Our goal in this analysis was to assess movement between districts and 
charter schools that were open for business over the two-year period of the study, rather 
than forced moves due to school closures.  While some of the school districts in our 
sample are small, we did not exclude them from the analysis because there is a wide 
range in school district size in Arizona.  In 2008-09, 20% of all school districts in 
Arizona served 100 or fewer students while 12% served 10,000 or more students.6  
Our final dataset contains almost the full population of elementary grade districts 
and approximately half of the charter schools in the state.7  While our data allow us to 
assess movements between public school districts and charter schools, it underestimates 
the student movement within the traditional public school sector because we cannot 
track intradistrict movement.  Our data also do not allow us to address within-year 
mobility, which is a different although related phenomenon.  Our goal in this analysis is 
to provide insights into why students and families, once enrolled in a particular district 
or charter school, leave that setting and enroll elsewhere.  Likewise, while our data allow 
us to examine interdistrict and charter school mobility at one point in time, the patterns 
we document here may change as the number of charter schools expands and charter 
school enrollment increases. 
 
Demographic and Achievement Variables 
 
Our dataset also included counts of movers and stayers by race/ethnicity, which 
we used to calculate variables for the percentages of students attending the districts and 
charter schools in our sample that were eligible to re-enroll by race/ethnicity and the 
race/ethnicity of movers.  These variables allow us to assess the possible impact of 
student mobility on district and charter school demographics.  That is, do the patterns 
have the potential to increase racial segregation in districts and charter schools? 
Once the dataset was constructed, we merged it with additional variables drawn 
from the CCD and state achievement data.  Two additional demographic variables are 
drawn from the CCD:  a) the percentage of students in the district or charter school who 
have an individual education plan (IEP); and b) the percentage of students eligible for 
free and reduced lunch.  For district and charter school achievement, we used the 
                                                 
6 See also Carlson et al. (2011), which retained small districts in multivariate analyses.  
7 Nineteen small elementary districts located outside of CBSAs were not included in the analysis.  The 
majority (63%) of these served fewer than 100 students.  Likewise, there were eight unified school 
districts, all located outside of CBSAs, that served fewer than 13,000 students in total in 2010-11 that were 
not included in the analysis.   
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district-level Normal Curve Equivalent (NCE) on the state-administered Terra Nova 
tests in Reading, Language Arts, and Mathematics, which we averaged across all 
elementary grades tested. Because the 2007-08 scores were released after the 2008-09 
school year began, we used the 2006-07 test results because it was the achievement data 
that was publicly available when families were making their schooling decisions for 
2008-2009.   
 Our analysis proceeds as follows.  After providing descriptive statistics for both 
sectors, we analyze the patterns of movement to and from school districts and to and 
from charter schools separately.  We begin by analyzing each type of within-CBSA 
movement, using regression models.  Next we analyze how mobility flows work 
together by identifying high and low mobility districts.  Our final analysis examines 





Our full sample contained 177 school districts and 233 charter schools.8  While 
the descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 highlight important differences between the 
two sectors, the sizable standard deviations on most variables indicate that there was 
considerable variation within each group.  For example, while charter schools served far 
fewer elementary grade students than the school districts, there was also a wide range in 
district size (from four elementary grade students who were eligible to re-enroll to more 
than 32,000).  The median district served approximately 600 elementary grade students. 
                                                 
8 Charters operated by the same educational management organization (EMO) essentially function as a 
district in the analysis and are treated as districts in CCD and the state achievement data. Our sample 
contained 233 of the 281 elementary-serving charter schools that were open during both years of the study.  
The loss in cases is due in part because the charter schools were treated as districts when the data was 
aggregated. 
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Students End 2007-08 (#) 2598 (4809) 187 (240) 
Total Movers (#)   207 (324)   35 (56) 
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#) 2590 (4781) 190 (239) 
Total Incoming (#)   196 (324)   39 (66) 
Percentage difference    -.85 (6.41)   13.13 (107.47) 
Mobility Variables   
Movers (%)   9.25 (6.12) 21.69 (11.91)*** 
   Movers to Local School Districts 53.54 (29.08) 66.06 (22.54)*** 
   Movers to Local Charter Schools 12.53 (14.38) 21.41 (17.59)** 
Incoming (%)   8.40 (4.32) 22.75 (16.39)*** 
   Incoming from Local School Districts 55.58 (30.45) 67.22 (24.48)*** 
   Incoming from Local Charter Schools   9.66 (10.62) 20.03 (19.21)*** 
Demographic and Achievement Variables   
End of 2007-08 (%)   
   White 46.14 (29.32) 55.37 (28.65) 
   Hispanic 39.72 (28.45) 28.65 (25.72)** 
   African American   2.90 (3.72)    6.81 (7.92)*** 
   American Indian   9.81 (23.53)    6.07 (17.39)** 
   Asian American   1.43 (1.79)    3.10 (3.82)*** 
Movers (%)   
   White 47.84 (30.36) 53.52 (29.34) 
   Hispanic 33.47 (27.32) 28.39 (26.30) 
   African American   3.96 (5.80)   7.67 (11.48)*** 
   American Indian 11.61 (24.50)   6.25 (17.33)*** 
    Asian American   1.43 (2.82)   3.30 (6.89)*** 
IEP (%) 12.83 (5.49)   9.31 (7.96) 
IEP missing (%)     .02 (.15)      .06 (.24)*** 
FRL students (%) 55.26 (24.95) 47.10 (28.30)** 
FRL students missing     .12 (.33)     .30 (.46)*** 
Mean NCE Reading 49.32 (7.13) 51.79 (10.52)*** 
Mean NCE Language Arts 48.97 (6.72) 51.87 (10.73)*** 
Mean NCE Mathematics 49.72 (7.35) 51.34 (11.21)*** 
Achievement Missing     .08     .13 
Locale        N (%)      N (%) 
   City    26 (15) 132 (57) 
   Suburb    12 (7)   41 (18) 
   Town    33 (19)   20 (9) 
   Rural 106 (60)   40 (17) 
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001 
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We began by examining general mobility patterns by sector before distinguishing 
between movement to and from charter schools, which is clearly active choice, and other 
types of mobility.  We used t-tests to assess the statistical significance of the between-
sector differences in means we observed.  Our initial analysis indicated that on average, 
9% of the students attending local school districts and 22% of students attending charter 
schools enrolled in a new district or charter school between the end of the 2007-08 and 
the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year.  The percentage of students entering each 
sector roughly mirrored these figures (Table 1).  In general, school districts and charter 
schools with high rates of movers (out-migration) also had relatively high percentages of 
incoming students (in-migration).  The correlation between the percentage of students 
moving out of districts or charter schools and the percentage of incoming students 
was .58 (n = 410, p < .001).9 The sample of charter schools had, on average, much 
higher rates of both in- and out-migration than the school districts.   
When we disaggregated the overall mobility rates to examine how much student 
movement occurred within the CBSA and by destination, it was clear that interdistrict 
mobility in Arizona is substantial.  Even though charter schools have higher rates of 
mobility overall, because they are a much smaller sector of local public school 
“markets,” there are many more students moving between school districts than between 
charter schools.  These figures also indicate that interdistrict mobility in Arizona was 
higher than in Colorado and Minnesota over the same period (Carlson et al., 2011).  In 
addition, the percentage of students who entered charter schools from local school 
districts was similar to the percentage of students who exited charter schools for local 
school districts, which suggested a two-way pattern of student movement (Authors, 
2012). On average, about two-thirds of the students leaving school districts moved 
within the CBSA (54% to another district and 13% to a charter school), compared to 
87% of charter school students.  A majority (66%) of students leaving charter schools 
moved to school districts within the CBSA while 21% moved to local charter schools.  
The state averages for incoming students roughly mirrored those of movers in each 
sector.  These figures suggest that a substantial portion of charter school mobility is due 
to active choice, and one important type of active choice is enrollment in a school 
district after attending a charter school. 
The 177 school districts in our sample served a lower percentage of White, 
African American, and Asian students and a higher percentage of Hispanic and 
American Indian students than the charter schools.  Many of the differences in 
demographic composition were statistically significant. The racial demographics of the 
students who left our school districts were similar to the demographics of the school 
districts, as were the demographics of incoming students (not shown).  As a result, the 
racial demographics of the elementary grade students enrolled in either sector changed 
very little from the end of 2007-08 to the beginning of 2008-09.  School districts also 
served higher percentages of students with Individual Education Plans (IEPs) and 
                                                 
9 Our main variables of interest account for district or charter school size because they are the number of 
movers or incoming students by sector, divided by the total number of elementary students eligible to re-
enroll.  There were no substantial differences in the correlations when the sample was divided by sector. 
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students eligible for free and reduced lunch and the cross-sector differences were 
statistically significant.  However, a substantial number of districts (12%) and charter 
schools (30%) were missing information on the latter.   
Student achievement in the charter schools was marginally higher than 
achievement in the school districts across all subjects, and t-tests indicated that the 
differences in achievement were statistically significant.  Most of the charter schools 
(75%) were located in cities and suburbs, while more than half of the school districts 
were in rural areas.  In the analysis that follows, we begin with a more detailed analysis 




 We used a subset of the variables shown in Table 1 to predict the characteristics 
associated with each type of mobility using ordinary least squares regression (OLS).  
The variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were 
the characteristics of the districts students were moving from, while the variables in the 
models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the districts 
students were moving to.  Because we were missing information on the variables for the 
percentage of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a 
reduced sample of 161 school districts.  However, t-tests indicated that there were no 
differences between the full sample and the regression sample (the descriptive statistics 
for the regression sample are provided in Appendix 1).10  Percentage White students is 
the omitted variable.  Because districts varied considerably in the percentage of movers 
or incoming students and size (see Table 1), we also included these variables in the 
model.  For the latter we used the number of eligible students who could re-enroll in an 
elementary grade (Students End 2007-08) as a proxy for district size.  We also included 
the indicator variables for locale; city is the omitted comparison category. 
Larger districts had more incoming students from charter schools, which is likely 
because larger districts are more likely to have a greater number of charter schools 
within or near their boundaries.  Student demographic variables were associated with 
some, but not all forms of student movement to and from school districts.  For example, 
school districts with higher percentages of Hispanic students were more likely to have 
higher rates of movement to and from local school districts, which may reflect the high 
rates of mobility among these groups.  Districts with higher percentages of Hispanic 
students also had lower rates of mobility to charter schools. The results for the 
percentages of African American, American Indian and Asian American students were 
less consistent across the models, which is likely because these are relatively small 
demographic groups compared to Hispanic and White students.  All else held equal, the 
percentage of students with IEPs was negatively associated with movement to charter 
schools.  This may be because families receiving special education services in a school 
district are less likely to be attracted to charter schools, which tend to have less capacity 
to provide such services.  Charter schools could also discourage families whose children 
                                                 
10 We did not include percentage of free and reduced lunch students in the final model because it would 
have resulted in a substantial loss of cases for both districts and charter schools. 
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have disabilities from enrolling (Zetino, 2017).  IEP services may also be a pull factor 
that encourages families to remain enrolled in a school district. 
Districts with lower student achievement had higher rates of movement to charter 
schools, which is not surprising.  Yet districts with higher achievement had higher rates 
of student movement to other school districts.  This finding is inconsistent with the 
theory underlying school choice reforms; we would expect that students would be more 
likely to remain enrolled in higher performing districts.  Our models could also reflect 
two different dimensions of student mobility:  a) reactive mobility between small 
districts serving high percentages of poor and minority students, and b) active choice of 
students within higher achieving districts who seek to move to districts with higher 
achievement than the districts they initially enrolled in (Carlson et al., 2011).  However, 
the achievement of the receiving district was not a significant predictor of student 
movement into school districts from other districts or from charter schools.  Interdistrict 
choice – which may or may not be a form of active choice – was the dominant form of 
school choice overall and the main form of student movement in districts with high 
percentages of underrepresented minority students.  In addition, there were no clear 
patterns between student movement and student achievement.  Finally, districts located 
in towns had less movement to and from school districts, which could reflect their 
relative isolation compared to urban districts. 
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Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to School Districts. 

















































































































     
R2 (N=161) .40 .28 .41 .22 
+p< .10. *p< .05. **p<.01 ***p< .001 
 
While the regression analyses provide insights into the factors that, on average, 
have the strongest relationships with the different types of mobility we identified, we 
were also interested in understanding the joint effect of student inflow and outflow on 
districts and charter schools.  That is, were some districts and charter schools 
experiencing high rates of loss via students leaving without similar rates of student 
inflow or vice versa?  In our initial analysis, we found that in general, within the 27 city 
and suburban districts in metropolitan Phoenix, districts with high percentages of 
movers also had high rates of incoming students (Authors, 2012).  To determine if this 
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pattern held with the statewide sample, we identified the districts that were in the lowest 
and highest quartiles for movement in and out of the district and cross-classified them, 
as shown in Table 3.  Table 4 provides the characteristics of each group of schools. 
 
Table 3 
Cross-Classification of Districts by Mobility Quartiles 
 School Districts 




Low % Incoming 22   3 
High % Incoming   3 25 
 
Just over half of the districts (25) that had the highest percentages of exiting 
students were also among the districts with the highest percentages of entering students, 
which we describe as high mobility districts.  Similarly, half of the districts with the 
lowest percentages of exiting students also were among the districts with the lowest 
percentages of exiting students (low mobility districts).  Few districts had very high rates 
of out-migration and low rates of in-migration or vice versa.  Nine of the high mobility 
districts were small districts with fewer than 100 students in the sample; in only three of 
these a handful of students moved to a charter school within the CBSA.  Most of the 
high mobility districts (80%) were rural districts, so the demographic characteristics of 
this group closely matched the profile of the rural districts in the sample, which were 
smaller and served higher percentages of White students than the full sample of 
districts.11  On average, 80% of the exiting students in high mobility districts enrolled in 
another district or charter school within the CBSA, although there was a substantial 
amount of variation within the group.   
 
                                                 
11 Descriptive statistics for rural districts available on request. 
17
Powers et al.: The Dynamics of Public School Choice in Arizona













Students End 2007-08 (#) 1110 (1323) 1983 (3185) 
Total Movers (#)   152 (179)     88 (171) 
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#) 1113 (1334) 1985 (3187) 
Total Incoming (#)   155 (186)     91 (174) 
Mobility Variables   
Movers (%) 18.08 (26.06)   3.51 (1.53) 
   Movers to Local School Districts 66.40 (26.07) 38.26 (30.22) 
   Movers to Local Charter Schools 13.82 (17.97) 16.04 (22.56) 
Incoming (%) 14.24 (3.51)   3.50 (1.65) 
   Incoming from Local School Districts 69.42 (30.38) 37.99 (32.66) 
   Incoming from Local Charter Schools   8.26 (10.60)   8.45 (11.09) 
Demographic and Achievement 
Variables 
  
End of 2007-08 (%)   
   White 49.36 (33.16) 41.46 (37.34) 
   Hispanic   5.41 (5.78)      .76 (1.03) 
   African American 41.30 (28.17) 45.56 (41.30) 
   American Indian   2.22 (2.70) 11.45 (25.44) 
   Asian American   1.72 (1.75)      .75 (.95) 
Movers (%)   
   White 54.04 (35.28) 36.11 (35.49) 
   Hispanic   6.62 (8.81)   .76 (2.00) 
   African American 34.83 (27.81) 36.90 (38.82) 
   American Indian   3.12 (4.48) 16.25 (29.38) 
   Asian American   1.40 (2.18) .88 (1.56) 
IEP (%) 14.03 (8.40) 26.48 (21.18) 
IEP missing (%)   0 .09 
FRL students (%) 51.76 (24.25) 59.36 (25.93) 
FRL students missing     .16     .13 
Mean NCE Reading 47.93 (6.82) 47.19 (6.56) 
Mean NCE Language Arts 47.04 (4.77) 47.56 (6.05) 
Mean NCE Mathematics 48.23 (5.66) 47.74 (6.52) 
Achievement Missing     .24     .09 
Locale   N (%)   N (%) 
    City   2 (8)   3 (14) 
    Suburb   1 (4)   0 
    Town   2 (8) 10 (45) 
    Rural 20 (80)   9 (41) 
 
18




In contrast, only three of the low mobility districts served fewer than 100 
students, and two of these were extremely small districts with less than 10 students.  
Fifty-four percent of the students who left these districts moved to other districts or 
charter schools within the CBSA, which suggests that almost half of the students who 
moved left the local area.  Low mobility districts also served a substantially higher 
percentage of American Indian students than the average for school districts, which 
indicates that many of these districts are located in or near reservations.  On average, 
high and low mobility districts served a higher percentage of students with IEPs than the 
full sample of schools, but the percentage of students with IEPs in low mobility districts 
was more than twice the average of the full sample (see Table 1), which suggests that 
special education services may be an important factor keeping families enrolled in 
school districts.  Conversely, on average high mobility districts served lower percentages 
of students receiving free and reduced lunch than the full sample, while low mobility 
districts served higher percentages of free and reduced lunch students.   
Although low mobility and high mobility districts did not differ substantially in 
average achievement, both were slightly below the state average.12  In general, student 
mobility to and from school districts was only weakly related to district achievement.  If 
student mobility to and from districts was driven by district achievement, then we would 
expect the highest achieving districts to have the highest percentages of in-migration and 
the lowest percentages of out-migration, but this was not the case.  For example, only 10 
of the districts in the highest quartile for mathematics achievement were also among the 
districts with the highest percentage of incoming students.  Finally, except for two small 
districts with fewer than 50 students in the sample the demographics of the highest 
mobility districts did not change substantially from 2007-08 to 2008-09.13  In these 
districts the movement of 10 students made a substantial difference (changes of five 




In Table 5 we repeat the regression analyses we conducted on the school district 
sample with the charter school sample.  As in the analyses shown in Table 2, the 
variables in the models predicting the percentage of movers (columns 1 and 2) were the 
characteristics of the charter schools the students were moving from, while the variables 
in the models for percentage of incoming students were the characteristics of the charter 
school students were moving to.  Because we were missing information on the variables 
for the percent of students with an IEP and achievement, our final model is based on a 
reduced sample of 198 charter schools.  As with the district sample, t-tests indicated that 
there were no differences between the full sample and the regression sample (see 
                                                 
12 This pattern held when we looked at district achievement for the districts with the highest percentage of 
movers.  Average mathematics achievement for these 37 districts was less than two percentage points 
lower than the remaining 125 districts (achievement data was not available for 15 districts). 
13 For example, 54% of the students leaving high mobility districts were White, as were 57% of the 
students moving into the district.  As a result, the demographics of eligible movers in this group of 
districts were virtually the same over the two periods we analyzed. 
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Appendix 1).  In contrast to the school district models, the variables for percentage of 
movers and percentage of incoming students were statistically significant and mirrored 
each other, indicating that in general, students from charter schools with higher 
percentages of movers were moving to other charter schools.  Likewise, charter schools 
with higher percentages of incoming students had higher percentages of students coming 
into the schools from other charter schools rather than school districts. As the percentage 
of Asian American students in a charter school increased, the percentage of students 
moving to another charter school increased, although this finding is difficult to assess 
given the relatively small percentages of Asian American students enrolled in Arizona’s 
school districts and charter schools.   
The statistically significant coefficients for achievement could reflect the 
location of charter schools.  Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming 
students from school districts tend to be located within or near the boundaries of lower 
achieving school districts, which is reflected by the negative coefficient for achievement 
and vice versa.  Charter schools with higher percentages of incoming students from local 
charter schools tend to be located in or near districts with higher achievement.  The 
positive coefficient for movement to school districts and the negative coefficients for 
movement to and from charter schools for charter schools located in towns and rural 
areas likely reflects the limited numbers of charter schools in these areas.  Finally, the R2 
was relatively low for all models.  Comparing across the regression models for school 
districts and charter schools suggests that there were different processes underlying 
student movement between districts compared to student movement between districts 
and charter schools.   
 
Table 5 
Regression Analyses Predicting Mobility from and to Charter Schools 































































American Indian -.014 .07 -.009  .06  
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R2 (N=198) .11 .19 .12 .22 
 
As with the analysis of school districts presented above, we cross-classified the 
charter schools that were in the highest and lowest mobility quartiles.  The patterns of 
mobility for charter schools mirrored those of the school districts.  Forty-three percent of 
the charter schools that had the highest rates of out-migration also had the highest rates 
of in-migration.  Likewise, half of the charter schools with the lowest rates of out-
migration also had the lowest rates of in-migration.  High mobility charter schools 
ranged from some extremely small schools (two enrolled fewer than 10 elementary 
school students who were eligible to re-enroll at the end of 2007-08) to the largest 
charter school in the sample, which served over 2,200 elementary school students in 
2007-08.  Low mobility charter schools ranged in size from one rural charter school that 
enrolled 10 elementary school students to another rural charter school with more than 
1,500 students.  In general, the rural charter schools had the lowest mobility rates, which 
could reflect the limited education markets in those areas.  Most of the high mobility 
charter schools were located in urban areas, although five of the 25 (20%) were located 
in rural areas.  
 
Table 6 
Cross-Classification of Charter Schools by Mobility Quartiles 
 Charter Schools 




Low % Incoming 30   5 
High % Incoming   4 25 
 
Compared to low mobility charter schools, high mobility charter schools served 
lower percentages of White and Asian American students and higher percentages of 
African American and Hispanic students.  Both high and low mobility charter schools 
served higher percentages of students with IEPs than the full sample of charter schools; 
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however, high mobility schools served substantially higher percentages of students who 
were eligible for free and reduced lunch than the full sample and low mobility schools, 
which may be a function of locale as a majority of the high mobility schools were 
located in urban areas. 
High mobility charter schools also had lower achievement than the full sample of 
charter schools and substantially lower achievement than low mobility charter schools 
(between 12 and 17 percentage points depending on the subject).  This pattern is 
consistent with what we might expect if families are choosing schools based on student 
achievement.  Yet fewer than half (39%) of the charter schools in the lowest quartile for 
achievement were among the schools with the highest rates of outgoing students.  
Likewise, only 12% of the lowest achieving charter schools were among the schools 
with the lowest rates of incoming students, which suggests that families’ choices of 
charter schools are not primarily driven by quality as measured by student achievement. 
Because many of the high mobility charter schools were small (19 of the 25 served 100 
or fewer elementary students), the movement of a few students could substantially 
change the demographics of a school or group of schools from one year to the next.  
That said, as a group, the only major change in demographics was that the highest 
mobility charter schools served approximately four percent fewer White students and the 














Low Mobility  
(N=30) 
Mean (S.D.) 
# Students End 2007-08 165 (446) 371 (350) 
# Students Beg. 2008-09 180 (463) 361 (339) 
Percent Movers 41.66 (11.65)     8.01 (3.59) 
    % Moving to Local School Districts 55.31 (26.10)   66.19 (25.69 ) 
    % Moving to Local Charter Schools 19.53 (17.28) 18.36 (19.02) 
Percent Incoming 45.15 (13.58)   6.15 (2.77) 
    % Incoming from Local School Districts 61.13 (26.26) 67.24 (28.36) 
    % Incoming from Local Charter Schools 18.12 (19.11) 20.80 (21.32) 
End of 2007-08   
    % White 54.40 (26.10) 66.10 (30.39) 
    % African American   8.40 (7.54)   2.94 (3.03) 
    % Hispanic 25.95 (21.70) 18.65 (24.29) 
    % American Indian   8.14 (12.20)   7.85 (24.19) 
    % Asian American   3.11 (3.75)   4.46 (5.02) 
Movers   
    % White 54.30 (26.92) 64.42 (33.86) 
    % African American   7.49 (9.20)   2.64 (4.09) 
    % Hispanic 23.20 (21.82) 18.38 (23.24) 
    % American Indian 12.57 (18.32)   5.87 (20.14) 
    % Asian American   2.44 (5.04)   5.36 (10.03) 
IEP (%) 12.19 (7.70) 13.13 (20.63) 
IEP missing      .12     .03 
FRL students (%) 54.76 (27.37) 31.94 (31.54) 
FRL students missing     .20      .23 
Mean NCE Reading 45.23 (7.73) 58.13 (10.12) 
Mean NCE Language Arts 45.96 (8.29) 57.78 (10.39) 
Mean NCE Mathematics 42.02 (7.75) 58.53 (11.34) 
Achievement Missing     .20     .03 
Locale    N (%)   N (%) 
    City 16 (64) 11 (37) 
    Suburb   2 (8)   7 (23) 
    Town   2 (8)   4 (13) 




 Our final analysis compared district mobility and charter school mobility within 
and across the three CBSAs where the largest numbers of students in the state reside: 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, Tucson, and Yuma.  These three CBSAs served 86% of the 
students attending traditional public schools in Arizona.  We provide descriptive 
statistics for the school districts and charter schools within the CBSA.  We also created 
maps of the CBSAs showing the districts and charter schools in our samples using 
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ArcGIS.  The maps depict the districts and charter schools within each CBSA; the 
districts are shaded based on the average of percent movers and percent incoming.14 This 
analysis allowed us to better understand and compare the spatial dimensions of three 
very different educational markets, and visually represent the relationship between 
charter school location and interdistrict mobility (Lubienki & Lee, 2017) in a way that 
cannot be captured in a table of descriptive statistics.  However, the descriptive statistics 
also helped us interpret some of the patterns we identified using the maps.   
                                                 
14 The scale of the mobility variable on the three maps is different because district mobility varied across 
the three CBSAs. 
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Descriptive Statistics by CBSA and Sector 




















# Students End 2007-08 5095 (6322) 216 (286) 4392 (7010) 159 (163) 1999 (2389) 286 (232) 
# Students Beg. 2008-09 5080 (6300) 220 (283) 4378 (6876) 162 (169) 1990 (2363) 305 (238) 
Percent Movers 9.86 (4.49) 22.55 (11.72) 6.96 (2.70) 22.88 (12.62) 5.42 (1.92) 10.81 (3.54) 
    % Moving to Local School Districts 73.63 (18.98) 69.29 (18.88) 60.53 (20.02) 58.25 (26.52) 69.40 (16.99) 85.05 (2.18) 
    % Moving to Local Charter Schools 15.25 (11.22) 23.57 (14.84) 16.29 (8.68) 27.54 (23.22) 9.09 (10.43) 6.86 (8.71) 
Percent Incoming 9.98 (4.05) 24.61 (18.28) 7.31 (1.75) 21.45 (13.76) 4.93 (2.87) 21.27 (14.14) 
    % Incoming from Local School Districts 75.17 (17.92) 71.54 (20.28) 65.46 (17.05) 60.49 (28.25) 79.19 (19.36) 89.03 (11.14) 
    % Incoming From Local Charter Schools 12.52 (9.49) 23.12 (18.64) 14.57 (8.24) 21.85 (21.22) 4.49 (5.83) 3.60 (5.17) 
End of 2007-08       
    % White 36.84 (27.18) 54.62 (27.42) 44.24 (23.97) 46.92 (26.65) 17.88 (12.58) 34.86 (23.30) 
    % African American 5.67 (4.56)  9.20 (8.93) 2.73 (2.01) 5.53 (4.78) .92 (1.19) 3.31 (.79) 
    % Hispanic 50.63 (26.53) 27.78 (24.19) 40.25 (22.52) 38.57 (26.66) 79.34 (12.88) 55.72 (27.80) 
    % American Indian 4.73 (12.27) 4.94 (15.20) 10.34 (25.85)  5.33 (14.99) 1.42 (1.23) 2.98 (1.85) 
    % Asian American 2.14 (1.90)  3.46 (4.12) 2.44 (3.04) 3.64 (4.02) .44 (.77) 3.14 (3.72) 
IEP (%) 12.13 (4.17) 8.67 (8.90) 13.88 (4.29) 11.96 (13.23) 10.32 (2.50) 8.22 (2.80) 
IEP missing 0 .05 .07 .10 0 0 
FRL students (%) 52.90 (27.74) 43.27 (29.13) 37.90 (32.91) 54.78 (29.63) 79.48 (14.55) 63.91 (19.05) 
FRL students missing .09 .35 .21 .39 .13 0 
Mean NCE Reading 47.64 (7.23) 51.97 (10.14) 52.38 (8.94) 52.53 (12.50) 45.02 (5.36) 48.42 (5.15) 
Mean NCE Language Arts 47.63 (7.14) 52.42 (10.29) 52.08 (8.59) 52.62 (11.91) 47.43 (4.56) 49.58 (6.19) 
Mean NCE Mathematics 48.29 (7.26) 51.76 (11.02) 53.25 (9.59) 52.58 (13.45) 47.78 (4.53) 47.56 (5.59) 
Achievement missing .02 .14 .07 .15 .13 0 
Locale  N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
    City 20 (31)  87 (63) 2 (14) 31 (76) 2 (25) 3 (100) 
    Suburb 7 (11) 31 (22) 5 (36) 7 (17) 0 0 
    Town 6 (9) 3 (2) 1 (7) 1 (2) 2 (25) 0 
    Rural 31 (48) 18 (13) 6 (43) 2 (5) 4 (50) 0 
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Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale.  In the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA, there 
are 64 districts that range from small rural districts serving fewer than 100 
students, small central city elementary districts that serve between 1,200 and 
20,000 students and large unified districts serving 25,000 students or more. There 
are 11 small elementary districts in the central city area that feed into a single 
high school district.  Four other elementary districts classified by the U.S. Census 
Bureau as city districts send students to high school districts with attendance 
boundaries that cross the Phoenix city limits.  The five remaining city districts 
located north and east of the central city area are larger unified districts.  Figure 1 
illustrates how charter schools in the Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale CBSA are fairly 
evenly distributed across the central city area and within the largest district in the 
CBSA, the Mesa Unified School District.  The map also highlights how there are 
relatively few charter schools in some of the districts with the highest mobility 
shown in blue, as well as a substantial number of charter schools distributed 
across in the lowest mobility districts, which are shown in yellow. 
To provide a snapshot of the range of student movement patterns within 
the CBSA, we compared movement patterns to and from the 15 elementary 
districts with those of the three unified districts that are classified as large city 
districts in the CCD.  The two groups of districts had very different demographic 
profiles.  In Arizona’s public schools, the two largest demographic groups are 
Whites and Hispanics, which were fairly evenly represented in the districts and 
charter schools included in our analysis.  The 15 elementary districts were 
predominantly Hispanic in 2007-08 (69% on average), while the unified districts 
were majority White (71%).  Likewise, the elementary school districts served a 
much higher percentage of free and reduced lunch students (70%) than the unified 
districts (25%).  On average, 11% of the students attending schools in the central 
city elementary districts in 2007-08 moved to other districts or charter schools at 
the beginning of 2008-09.  Virtually all of these students moved within the 
CBSA; most (82%) moved to other districts and another 13% moved to charter 
schools.  The figures for incoming students to the districts were roughly the same 
although the average rate of incoming students from charter schools was slightly 
lower (11%).  The unified districts had lower overall rates of movement out of the 
districts (five percent on average) and while 92% of the movers went to districts 
or charter schools within the CBSA, they moved to charter schools at a much 
higher rate (22%).  As with the elementary districts, the figures for incoming 
students mirrored those of the outgoing students.  Overall, these patterns indicate 
that the unified districts in the Phoenix metropolitan area tended to serve more 
advantaged students who are more likely to engage in active choice. 
While we found similar differences between the elementary and unified 
districts in the much smaller (seven in total) group of suburban districts in the 
CBSA, within the rural districts there did not seem to be a clear difference 
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between the movement patterns of elementary and unified districts.  On average, 
the rates of movement in and out of the rural districts were similar to the city 
elementary districts (10% and 11%, respectively), although comparatively fewer 
(85%) of the students attending rural districts moved within the CBSA.  Both 
rural and suburban districts were more diverse than their central city counterparts.  
While the percentage of Hispanic students was slightly higher than the percentage 
of White students in both groups of districts, neither group was a majority.  
Except for rural charter schools, which had lower average rates of out-migration 
(17%) and higher rates of in-migration (25%) than all charter schools in the 
CBSA, we did not find any clear differences in the mobility patterns across 
groups of charter schools when we divided them by locale.21 
                                                 
21 The pattern was the reverse for the three charter schools located in areas classified as towns by 
the U.S. Census Bureau but it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from such a small group of 
schools.   
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Phoenix CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools 
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Tucson.  Most of the charter schools in the Tucson CBSA are located 
within the Tucson Unified School District (TUSD).  There are smaller numbers of 
charter schools within the unified school districts that adjoin TUSD:  Sunnyside, 
Flowing Wells, and Amphitheater (see Figure 2).  TUSD, Sunnyside and 
Ampitheater served the largest numbers of students in the CBSA.  While it did not 
have the highest percentage of students leaving the district, 32% of the students 
who left TUSD at the end of 2007-08 attended charter schools within the CBSA 
in 2008-09.  While TUSD’s rate of incoming students was slightly lower than the 
rate of outgoing students, close to the same share (28%) of those incoming 
students left charter schools to attend traditional public schools in TUSD.  Not 
surprisingly, given the number of charter schools within and near its borders, 
TUSD had the highest rates of charter school in-migration and out-migration 
within the CBSA.  The mobility patterns for the surrounding districts were similar 
but not as extreme – relatively high rates of out-migration to charter schools and 
similar rates of in-migration from charter schools.   
Unlike the Yuma and Phoenix CBSAs, on average the districts in the 
Tucson CBSA served approximately the same percentages of White and Hispanic 
students as the charter schools.  The school districts in the Tucson CBSA served a 
substantially higher percentage of American Indian students than the charter 
schools.  One of the state’s largest American Indian reservations is located within 
the Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified School District, a rural district that is 
geographically distant from the urban center where charter schools are 
concentrated (see Figure 2).  In 2007-08, 97% of the students in the sample 
attending schools in Indian Oasis were American Indian.22  Finally, also unlike 
Yuma and Phoenix, average student achievement was approximately the same in 
the districts and charter schools within the Tucson CBSA, although the higher 
standard deviation for the charter schools indicates that there was greater variation 
in achievement within the charter schools in the CBSA than there was across the 
school districts.   
                                                 
22 Because there were a substantial number of districts and charter schools missing information on 
the percentage of free and reduced lunch students served, it is difficult to draw clear cross-sector 
comparisons on that variable.   
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Tucson CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools 
Yuma.  Of the three CBSAs, the Yuma school districts and charter schools had 
the lowest mobility rates.  While the charter schools appear to have a high rate of 
incoming students, given that they served 5% of the elementary students in the 
sample in 2007-08, the number of students moving to charter schools is fairly 
small.  Within the Yuma CBSA, the three districts with the highest average 
mobility (shown in blue in Figure 3) were also the districts with the highest 
percentage of students leaving the districts (movers) and did not have any students 
leave for charter schools or enter the district from charter schools.  This is likely 
because they were geographically distant from the charter schools in the CBSA.  
Because these were among the smallest districts in the CBSA in terms of 
enrollment, the absolute numbers of students leaving and entering the districts 
was low.  In the four largest districts in the CBSA, between 11% and 24% of their 
movers left to attend charter schools.  However, between five and 16% of their 
incoming students entered from charter schools.  These districts adjoin one other 
in the Southwest corner of the state.  As Figure 3 highlights, the three charter 
schools in the sample are clustered within two miles of one another in the Yuma 
Elementary District near the border of the Crane Elementary District, and within 
10 miles of the other two districts’ borders.  Finally, the demographics of the two 
sectors varied considerably.  While only 17% of the students attending public 
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schools in the school district were Hispanic, 35% of the charter school students 
were White.  Likewise, the three charter schools served a substantially lower 
percentage of free and reduced price lunch students (64% on average) than the 
school districts (79%). 
 
Figure 3 
Yuma CBSA School Districts by Average Mobility and Charter Schools 
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In all three CBSAs, charter schools served a higher percentage of African 
American students than the school districts although their overall representation in 
the sample was low.  In both Yuma and Phoenix, the charter schools served a 
substantially higher percentage of White students and a substantially lower 
percentage of Hispanic students, which may be an outcome of White flight to 
charter schools in these education markets.  As in our previous analyses, the 
demographics of eligible re-enrollees in these school districts and charter schools 




While most analyses tend to focus on understanding the effects of a single 
school choice policy such as student movement from traditional public schools to 
charter schools, we assessed how students move between different sectors of the 
public school market in Arizona, a state with long-standing public school choice 
policies.  By analyzing interdistrict and charter school mobility simultaneously, 
we provide a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of public 
school choice.  Not only do patterns of student movement to and from charter 
schools differ from movement between school districts, but public school choice 
policies also affect districts in varied, yet systematic ways.  That said, the use of 
enrollment data provides only suggestive insights into the motivations behind 
these enrollment decisions – namely, whether the mobility patterns explored 
above were the result of active or reactive school choice. 
Our basic finding across these analyses is that even in a state with a well-
established charter school movement, most student movement is interdistrict 
mobility or movement between school districts.  Given that the charter school 
sector in Arizona is small relative to the traditional public school sector and 
charter schools are not evenly distributed across the state, this is not surprising.  
Although proportionally, charter schools tend to have higher rates of students 
leaving or entering schools than school districts, in absolute terms, these are 
relatively small numbers of students.  The average charter school received 24 
students at the beginning of the 2008-09 academic year from school districts 
within the CBSA and eight students from local charter schools.  In contrast, on 
average 179 students left school districts for other districts or charter schools 
within the CBSA: 142 to school districts and 37 to charter schools.  In both cases, 
the figures for incoming students mirror those of outgoing students.  Thus, the 
type of public school choice that is the most well-known and receives the most 
attention from policymakers is not the dominant form of school choice in Arizona.  
In most districts, over half of exiting and entering students move within the CBSA.  
This suggests that, to the extent they are competing for student enrollment, school 
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districts are largely competing with other school districts rather than charter 
schools.  In Arizona, interdistrict mobility has played a greater role in creating 
and sustaining the “educational market” than charter schools.  Because students 
may move between school districts within a CBSA because of household changes 
that prompt a school move, we cannot definitively attribute this form of student 
movement to active choice.  
While in some districts a substantial percentage of students leave to attend 
charter schools, students are also leaving charter schools to attend traditional 
public schools at roughly similar rates.  That is, mobility between charter schools 
and school districts is two-way.  While charters schools may attract students away 
from traditional public school districts when they are initially enrolling in schools, 
in general, charter school students are a fairly mobile group and most students 
who leave charter schools enroll in school districts.  Yet in absolute terms this is a 
small number of students.  Although there is considerable variation in student 
mobility between districts and charter schools, overall these patterns of student 
movement did not alter what are by now well-established patterns of stratification 
within and across each sector. 
Our regression analyses, which assessed the relationships between school 
characteristics and the different types of student movement, suggest that 
demographic characteristics and student achievement are more strongly related to 
movement to and from school districts than charter schools.  Our findings suggest 
that student mobility in school districts serving large percentages of minority 
students is likely motivated by reactive mobility rather than active choice.  
Conversely, special education services may be a pull factor that encourages 
families to remain enrolled in school districts. 
The cross-classification of schools by degree of mobility further 
illuminates the patterns we identified in our regression analyses, and specifically, 
the finding that in both sectors, mobility tends to be two-way rather than a pattern 
that suggests competition (Authors, 2012).  Some of the differences we observed 
between the two sectors are likely attributable in part to location.  High mobility 
districts were predominantly small rural districts that ranged widely in size from 
extremely small (serving fewer than 100 elementary school students) to above 
average.  Finally, the CBSA analysis highlights regional differences in patterns of 
mobility and how education markets vary considerably within and across local 
contexts.  It also indicates that many districts with relatively high mobility rates 
do not have a strong charter school presence, which again underscores how most 
student movement in Arizona is between public school districts.  Mapping district 
mobility patterns in relation to charter school location also highlighted how it is 
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While our study focuses on the educational marketplace in Arizona, a state 
with a long history of supporting student choice options and policies, our findings 
have relevance for policymakers and practitioners beyond the Arizona context.  
First, our study indicates that the patterns we identified for metropolitan Phoenix 
in our earlier study were also evident statewide and within other local markets 
(Authors, 2012).  Our simultaneous analysis of interdistrict and charter school 
mobility suggests that Arizona’s open enrollment policy may have a greater effect 
on student enrollment decisions and student mobility than simply the presence of 
charter schools alone because the movement between districts is proportionately 
larger than the movement to and from charter schools. It is likely that this pattern 
is not unique to Arizona but will be evident in other states that have interdistrict 
choice policies and charter schools operating simultaneously, a finding that has 
relevance for policymakers in other contexts.  In other states with multiple school 
choice policies such as Michigan and Ohio, and in particular those with 
mandatory open enrollment (Education Commission of the States, 2018), it is 
likely that open enrollment will have a greater effect on student enrollment 
decisions and student mobility than charter schools alone.   
 Second, patterns of mobility vary considerably across districts.  Districts 
with higher rates of in- and out-mobility may find it useful to work with 
neighboring districts to mitigate the effects of these two-way patterns of student 
mobility, which include the fiscal consequences of declining enrollments and the 
challenges of educating students that move frequently between districts and 
sectors.  Third, the analysis also highlights how a substantial number of students 
move from charter schools back into traditional public school settings, an 
understudied phenomenon.  This between-sector movement may be important for 
researchers interested in understanding how school choice works in other settings 
to address in their analyses (Author, 2017).  We need to better understand the 
characteristics of charter schools with high mobility rates as well as the 
characteristics of students who leave charter schools to return to traditional public 
schools and how these movements shape their educational careers.  Fourth, our 
findings reinforce the findings in previous studies of school choice programs and 
charter schools that low-income and minority students are more likely to move in 
and out of lower-performing charter schools and school districts.  Finally, in this 
study we are only able to address patterns of student movement but we do not 
know the motivations of families that underlie these patterns.  To fully understand 
how families engage with school choice policies, researchers, policymakers, and 
practitioners need to better document and analyze the reasons for student mobility 
before we can conclude that these enrollment patterns reflect families’ active use 
of market-based school choice policies.  
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Students End 2007-08 (#) 2853 (4972) 204 (250) 
Total Movers (#)   224 (324)   38 (59) 
Students Beg. 2008-09 (#) 2845 (4941) 206 (249) 
Total Incoming (#)   215   39 (68) 
Percentage difference    -.21 (4.66)   11.01 (111.43) 
Mobility Variables   
Movers (%)   8.58 (4.63) 21.31 (11.01) 
   Movers to Local School Districts 55.72 (28.03) 67.56 (20.33) 
   Movers to Local Charter Schools 12.76 (13.38) 22.20 (17.29) 
Incoming (%)   8.32 (3.97) 21.79 (15.28) 
   Incoming from Local School Districts 56.16 (28.51) 68.55 (22.53) 
   Incoming from Local Charter Schools 10.31 (10.23) 20.28 (17.83) 
Demographic and Achievement Variables   
End of 2007-08 (%)   
   White 44.09 (28.74) 55.60 (28.21) 
   Hispanic 41.23 (28.51) 29.42 (25.92) 
   African American   3.14 (3.78)   6.75 (  7.53) 
    American Indian   10.08 (23.48)   4.96 (14.62) 
    Asian American   1.47 (1.79)   3.25 (3.85) 
Movers   
   White 46.10 (28.96) 55.36 (28.18) 
   Hispanic 35.46 (27.08) 28.73 (25.70) 
   African American   4.27 (5.91)   7.32 (9.77) 
   American Indian 12.03 (24.50)   4.85 (13.85) 
   Asian American   1.51 (2.88)   3.73 (  7.31) 
IEP (%) 12.60 (4.24)   8.78 (5.37) 
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